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I. 
I~VTR~DUC~UON 
The  economic  difficulties  manifest  in communist 
countries  have  encouraged  a desire  in many  of them 
to  move  toward  a  market  economy.  This  paper 
surveys  specific  reasons  for  the  breakdown  of  cen- 
trally planned  economies  and  discusses  the  difficulties 
of  making  the  transition  to  a  market  economy.  A 
general  theme  is that  a market  economy  requires  the 
limitation  of  government  intervention  in  the 
marketplace.  This  theme  is illustrated  by  a discus- 
sion  of the  central  bank.  The  final  part  of the  paper 
advances  the  proposal  that  formerly  communist  coun- 
tries  eliminate  their  central  banks  by  adopting  the 
currency  of a large  western  country  with  a stable  cur- 
rency.  This  proposal  is discussed  in the  context  of 
the  German  monetary  union,  which  will  eliminate 
the  East  German  central  bank. 
II. 
B-OWN  OFTHE  SOCIALIST  ECONOMIES 
Market  Pricing 
The  economies  of communist  countries  collapsed 
in  part  because  external  forces  overwhelmed  their 
pricing  system.  In a market  economy,  prices  equate 
the  value  consumers  attach  to  consuming  more  of 
a good  to  the  costs  of  producing  more  of  it.  This 
equality  between  the  (marginal)  cost  of  consuming 
and  producing  a good  derives  from  the  incentives  in 
the  price  system  to eliminate  discrepancies  between 
the  marginal  benefit  of consuming  and  marginal  cost 
of producing  a good.  In contrast,  central  planners  set 
prices  as  part  of  an  implicit  tax-and-transfer  policy 
designed  to  subsidize  some  goods  by  taxing  others. 
On  first pass,  central  planners  set  the  price  of a firms 
output  at  whatever  level  is  necessary  to  cover  its 
average  labor  costs.  They  then  adjust  price  differen- 
tials  among  firms  in order  to  tax  some  kinds  of  out- 
put  and  subsidize  others. 
l  I received  useful  criticism  from John  Caskey,  Norman  Fieleke, 
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Typically,  basic  foodstuffs  and  commodities  are 
subsidized,  while  goods  considered  luxuries  are 
taxed.  For  example,  the  N&V Y&  25~~  (l/7/90,  p. 
E3)  reports  that  every  pound  of  butter  sold  in 
Czechoslovakia  costs  the  government  more  than 
$1.70  in subsidies.  The  nm  (4/3/90,  p.  A16)  also 
reports  that  in  the  Soviet  Union,  “the  government 
is forced  to  spend  about  $160  billion  in subsidies  on 
food  and  some  consumer  goods  annually,  while  the 
cost  of  many  industrial  goods  is  far  higher  than  in 
the  West.”  The  banking  system  extends  credit  to 
cover  the  deficits  of firms  whose  prices  are  set  below 
average  cost. 
Because  central  planners  did  not  change  prices  in 
line  with  changes  on  world  markets,  over  time,  the 
subsidies  required  by  their  price  system  became 
intolerably  expensive.  For  example,  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  energy  prices  were  not  raised  with  the  rise 
in world  prices.  The  resulting  increased  subsidy  to 
energy-intensive  activities  and  to  Comecon  countries 
receiving  oil  and  natural  gas  exports  removed  the 
incentive  to  economize  on  the  use  of  energy  and 
forced  the  Soviet  Union  to  make  large  investments 
in energy  production  that  strained  its economy.  The 
lack  of  a  free-market  price  system  to  coordinate 
economic  activity  in  communist  economies  meant 
that  these  economies  could  not  adjust  to  changes  in 
the  world  economy. 
Communist  countries  promisedequality  and  indi- 
vidual  security  to  their  citizens  in  return  for  their 
acceptance  of authoritarian  control.  As the  standard 
of  living  in communist  countries  fell  behind  that  of 
capitalist  countries,  the  need  to  deliver  on  this 
promise  became  more  pressing.  In practice,  in com- 
munist  counuies,  equality  meant  subsidizing  basic 
commodities  and  foodstuffs.  Individual  security 
meant  keeping  open  inefficient  enterprises  in order 
to  prevent  unemployment.  The  required  system  of 
taxes  and  transfers  became  too  costly  and  col- 
lapsed.  The  rationale  for communism  then  collapsed. 
In countries  like  Poland  and  the  Soviet  Union,  the 
pressure  to  provide  subsidies  overcame  the  ability 
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extension  to  enterprises  running  a deficit  had  to  be 
financed  by  printing  money.  The  resulting  inflation 
interacted  with  unchanged,  centrally  set prices  to pro- 
duce  shortages  and  lines.  The  time  spent  waiting  in 
line raises the  effective  price  paid for goods  and limits 
demand.  Workers  waiting  in line,  however,  cannot 
produce.  As production  fell, the  tax base  also fell and 
exacerbated  the  lack  of revenue  needed  to  finance 
subsidies.  In a letter  to the N&v York ir;,,  (12111189, 
p.  AlS),  a  visitor  to  Poland  wrote: 
I can  testify  to  the  harshness  of everyday  life,  where  there 
were  lines  for  every  kind  of  food,  for  appliances  and 
clothing,  etc.  There  were  lines  of  people  waiting  in  the 
morning  when  we  went  to  work,  and  they  were  still  there 
in  the  evening.  There  were  lines  forming  on  Sundays, 
awaiting  the  stores’  opening  on  Monday  if  some  home 
appliances  such  as  refrigerators,  TVs  or  kitchen  stoves 
were  promised.  The  average  housewife  had  to  run  out 
before  6  a.m.  to  get  some  breakfast,  and  after  work  or- 
school  each  member  of the  family  had  an  assigned  task  to 
stand  in  line  for  foodstuffs  or  other  essentials. 
By  reducing  the  real  value  of  fixed  prices,  infla- 
tion  lowered  the  return  to  producers,  who  then 
decreased  supplies.  An article  in the  Nm  Yo& Z%zr 
(lo/3  l/89,  p.  A4)  reported  that: 
. . . in  the  last  three  years  stocks  of  hogs,  Poland’s  prin- 
cipal  livestock,  fell  from  22  million  to  fewer  than  14 
million.  .  .  .  In  a  reversal  that  would  be  bizarre  in  the 
West,  but  is common  enough  here,  the  supply  of pork  has 
diminished  precisely  as  the  demand  has  grown.  What  has 
happened  is  that  the  farmers  have  killed  off  their  own 
herds  rather  than  prolong  their  own  agony  of  paying  the 
high  prices  fned  for  fed  grain  available  only  from  a  state 
monopoly  and  at the  same  time  selling  their  butchered  hogs 
for  prices  fared  low  enough  to  appease  consumers. 
Market  pricing  requires  an  end  to  price  controls. 
Price  reform,  however,  is  difficult  because  it 
redistributes  income.  The  queueing  produced  by the 
use  of price  controls  to suppress  inflation  redistributes 
income  to people  whose  time  has little  market  value, 
such  as  the  elderly  and  unskilled.  The  price  rises 
necessary  to eliminate  suppressed  inflation  eliminate 
queues,  but  they  also  raise  relative  prices  to  groups 
with  a  comparative  advantage  in  queueing. 
The  bribery  and  black  markets  that  inflation  and 
price  conuols  create  also render  price  reform  difficult 
politically.  Because  price  rationing  through  bribery 
and  the  “high” price  of black  markets  is illegal,  these 
rationing  mechanisms  create  a class of criminals.  The 
popular  impression  is  that  this  class  enriches  itself 
at  the  expense  of  the  ordinary  person  by  charging 
exorbitant  prices.  This  impression  is  correct  when 
state  employees  accept  bribes  and  when  individuals 
who  sell  in black  markets  acquire  goods  from  state- 
owned  enterprises  at controlled  prices.  As  a result, 
the  public  believes  that  market-determined  prices 
favor  the  few. 
Piecemeal  decontrol  of  prices  exacerbates  the 
public’s  distrust  of market  pricing  because  groups  sell- 
ing  goods  at  prices  that  are  high  relative  to  state- 
controlled  prices  become  a target  of popular  resent- 
ment.  For  example,  in the  Soviet  Union,  the  private 
cooperatives,  which  initially  could  sell at unregulated 
prices,  b.ecame  natural  scapegoats  for  politicians  in 
crises.  The  NW  Yorff  2h.s  (1 l/20/89,  p.  Al)  reports, 
“Mr.  Gorbachev  told  the  Soviet  parliament  this  fall 
that  the  soap  shortage  was  the  fault  of the  fledgling 
private  sector  cooperative  movement,  something  that 
he began  as part  of peresuoika  but which  has become 
so unpopular  with  the  people-because  of allegations 
of  profiteering-that  even  Mr.  Gorbachev  himself 
often  finds  it  an  easy  target.” 
Free  Trade 
In  a  market  economy,  resource  allocation  is 
based  on  the  value  placed  on  private  property  by 
market  prices.  In  market  economies,  price- 
coordinated  voluntary  exchange  among  individuals 
solves  the  related  problems  of how  to  assign  value 
to  scarce  resources  and  of  how  to  allocate  them. 
Integration  into  the  world  economy  requires  that  a 
country  make  its pricing  system  compatible  with  that 
of  the  world  economy  by  adopting  market  pricing. 
The  practice  in communist  counuies  of using  the 
price  system  to provide  subsidies  collapsed  when  they 
lost  their  ability to limit foreign  uade.  With  free trade, 
market  economies  export  goods  for  which  they 
possess  a comparative  advantage  in production.  By 
contrast,  with  free  uade,  communist  economies  ex- 
port  goods  they  subsidize,  thus  creating  bargain 
bazaars  for  foreigners  until  the  communist  govern- 
ments  run  out  of  funds  to  finance  exports.  As  ex- 
plained  to  the  Nm  Yoli4  7Zm  (1 l/30/89,  p.  Al)  by 
Gerhard  Stauch,  Chief  Inspector  for  East  German 
customs: 
The  smuggling-speculation  spree  has  been  stimulated  by 
the  relative  abundance  here  of  consumer  goods  that  are 
inexpensive  because  they  are  subsidized  up  to  45  percent 
.by  the  East  German  Government.  .  .  .  Last  Friday  the 
East  German  government  initiated  measures  to  curb  the 
smuggliig  and  speculation  by  declaring  it  illegal  for  for- 
eigners,  including  American  soldiers,  to purchase  a variety 
of goods.  This  placed  an additional  burden  on  the.customs 
service,  Mr.  Stauch  said,  because  many  of his  offricers had 
to  be  posted  in  .  .  .  department  stores. 
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attempting  to  keep  Soviet  citizens  from  other  areas 
from  purchasing  subsidized  goods  available  locally. 
According  to  the  Financial  Gms~(3/9/90,  p.  19), 
In  Leningrad  .  .  .  the  City  Council  has  just  introduced  a 
measure  which  forbids  non-residents  from  buying  a wide 
range  of basic  consumer  goods:  fresh  fruit  and  vegetables, 
cheese,  meat,  sausage,  knit-wear,  china,  watches,  and  so 
on.  This  act  of self-defense  against  marauders  from  neigh- 
boring  towns  is  certain  to  provoke  counter-measures  and 
could,  if unchecked,  lead  to fragmentation  of large  parts  of 
the  Soviet  economy. 
Private Property 
In  the  Soviet  Union,  Hungary  and  Yugoslavia, 
decentralization  of  decision-making  without  allow- 
ing free-market  pricing  and  without  creating  private 
property  rights  has  exacerbated  poor  economic  per- 
formance.  In  communist  counuies,  coordination 
among  enterprises  is  effected  through  commands 
issued  by  a central  committee  to  ministries  that  in 
turn  issue  commands  to enterprises.  Committees  of 
party  members  in enterprises  enforce  the  centrally 
issued  commands.  Party  members  exercise  conuol 
through  the  nomenklatura  system,  under  which  they 
appoint  key  officials  in  enterprises.  In  the  Soviet 
Union,  for example,  this system  gives the  party  direct 
conuol  over  as many  as three  million key jobs  (F&n- 
c&d 7hws,  10/l  7189,. p.  2).  In  the  Soviet  Union, 
perestroika  abandoned  this  system  of  coordination 
without  replacing  it with  coordination  by  the  price 
system. 
Under  communism,  capital  is  controlled  by 
members  of the  Communist  Party.  Authoritarian  con- 
trol  of party  members  places  controlof  the  capital 
stock  in  the  hands  of  the  central  committee.  The 
breakdown  in the  authority  exercised  by  the  Com- 
munist  Party  with  perestroika  and  with  the 
discrediting  of the  party  has meant  that  effective  con- 
uol  of  the  capital  stock  has  passed  into  the  hands 
of the  managers  of enterprises.  Pricing  decisions  then 
are  based  on  the  ability  of managers  to  exploit  the 
relative  monopoly  power  of  their  enterprises.  The 
returns  to  monopoly  power  are  divided  between 
managers  and  workers.  This  system,  despite  its 
decentralized  decision-making,  has proven  to be even 
more  inefficient  than  the  centrally  planned  system 
it  replaced.  The  Finuncziz~  i%ts(3/12/90,  p.  XIII) 
reports,  “A large  part  of the  Soviet  economy  is like 
a  quasi-medieval  economy,  based  on  exchange  of 
goods  in kind  in an inefficient  market,  which  operates 
without  publicised  prices.  It  is run  by  powerful  in- 
dusuial  fiefdoms,  rather  than  central  planners.” 
III. 
Transferring  State-Owned  Property 
In  attempting  to  make  the  transition  to  a market 
economy,  the  most  difficult  problem  formerly  com- 
munist  countries  face  is  how  to  transfer  the  state- 
owned  capital  stock  to  private  ownership.  In  coun- 
tries  like  the  Soviet  Union,  there  is a lack of popular 
support  for  private  ownership.  Historically,  owner- 
ship  of resources  has  been  determined  through  the 
coercive  power  of  the  state.  In  the  Soviet  Union, 
when  the  system  of  serfdom  broke  down  and  was 
replaced  by  the  system  of industrial  labor  relations 
in which  workers  are  employed  by  capital  owners, 
it was  natural  to  view  the  capital  owners  as  simply 
replacing  the  old landowners.  Conuol  of capital,  like 
conuol  of land  formerly,  was  viewed  as the  basis  for 
exploitation  of workers.  The  belief  that  the  owner- 
ship  of resources  is arbitrarily  determined  to benefit 
a  few  undermines  the  respect  for  property  rights 
necessary  to  maintain  a  market  economy. 
The  sale  and pricing  of state-owned  assets  will be 
socially  divisive.  Consider  houses,  which  are owned 
by  the  government  and  rented  at  uniform  rates. 
Viktor  Gerascenko,  President  of the  State  Bank  of 
the  USSR,  noted,  “.  .  . housing  is supplied  by  the 
state  at a ridiculously  low  price  which  fails to  differ- 
entiate  between  an  apartment  in  the  center  of 
Moscow  and  one  in  the  suburbs  that  is more  than 
an  hour’s  bus  ride  away.”  ((%+e?x  &L&J Sera, 
1 l/22/89).  In  East  Germany,  the  monthly  rent  for 
a  two-bedroom  house  in  the  center  of  East  Berlin 
is less than  a meal  for one  person  in a medium-priced 
restaurant  in West  Berlin  (Nm  Yorff Z%zr,  l/7/90, 
p.  E3).  The  sale  of houses  at  market  prices  estab- 
lished  through  auction  would  upset  ownership  pat- 
terns  completely.  The  people  who  lost  their  houses 
would  be  dissatisfied.  The  sale  of houses  at below- 
market,  uniform  prices  to  current  occupants, 
however,  would  preserve  a  status  quo  in  property 
rights  that  was  established  arbitrarily  or established 
through  political  influence. 
Transferring  state  assets  to private  owners  gradually 
will be difficult.  The  existence  of private  firms  along 
with  state  firms  creates  incentives  to  loot  the  state 
firms  by  secretly  transferring  assets  to  the  private 
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state  assets  that  will engender  widespread  public  sup- 
allow  the  marketplace  to  do  so.  Government  must 
port  for the  resulting  distribution  of property.  Govem- 
maintain  the  rules  of  the  competition  over  owner- 
ments  may  simply  have  to  hold  open  auctions  of all 
ship  of property  and  must  provide  an  independent 
state-owned  enterprises  and  accept  that  there  will be 
judiciary  to adjudicate  disputes  over  property  rights, 
winners  and  losers.2 
rather  than  decide  the  outcome  of the  competition 
for  ownership  of  property. 
Committing  to Private Property Rights 
In  a  market  economy,  individual  producers  and 
consumers  are the  planners,  and their  plans  are coor- 
dinated  by  the  price  system.  Each  individual  (each 
planner)  needs  to know  only  the  prices  immediately 
relevant  to  his activity.  In this  way,  the  price  system 
economizes  on  the  knowledge  that  each  individual 
(each planner)  must  possess.  As a consequence,  plans 
can  be  made  by  those  who  possess  detailed  infor- 
mation  about  particular  productive  activities.  In con- 
trast,  a  central  planner  needs  in principle  to  know 
everything  about  an  economy.  The  flaw  in  central 
planning  is that  no  planner  can  organize  such  a vast 
amount  of information-the  infinite  complexity  and 
rapid  change  of  modern  economies  simply  over- 
whelm  him. 
The  planners  of  a  market  economy,  that  is,  the 
individual  producers  and  consumers,  follow  the  price 
system’s  signals  out  of  a  desire  to  find  the  most 
remunerative  use  for  their  physical  and,  human 
resources.  Private  ownership  provides  the  incentive 
to use  resources  productively.  Governments  of coun- 
tries  desiring  to  make  the  transition  to  a  market 
economy  must  protect  private  property  rights.  In- 
stead  of assigning  property  rights  directly,  they  must 
A  primary  difficulty  in  maintaining  private  prop- 
erty  rights  in a market  economy  is the  inherent  am- 
biguity  between  private  and  public  property.  In par- 
ticular,  taxes  appropriate  part  of the  return  on private 
property  for the  state  and  effectively  force  the  indi- 
vidual  to share  ownership  of property  with  the  state. 
Although  private  ownership  of  property  is  not 
established  in an absolute  sense,  market  economies 
have  been  able to use  the  rule  of law and public  sup- 
port  for  private  property  to  reserve  a large  part  of 
the  return  (and  risk)  of ownership  of property  to  in- 
dividuals.  Just  as  important,  these  economies  have 
been  able  to  provide  a  significant  degree  of  con- 
sistency  in  the  rules  that  determine  the  share  of 
the  return  to  private  property  appropriated  by  the 
state  through  taxes.  This  consistency  is  essential 
in providing  an  incentive  to  accumulate  productive 
property. 
* In  western  countries,  when  a  fum  becomes  insolvent,  it  is 
immediately  placed  in  court  receivership  to  prevent  looting  by 
the  management.  In  the  United  States,  the  exception  to  this 
practice  was  the  insolvent  S&Ls  in  the  early  1980s  that  were 
allowed  to remain  open  through  deposit  insurance  that  relieved 
their  creditors  of default  risk.  The  S&L  experience  is analogous, 
say,  to  what  has  happened  in  Poland,  where  the  managers  of 
insolvent  state-owned  enterprises  have  transferred  resources  of 
these  enterprises  to  their  own  private  firms. 
2 In the  absence  of market  prices  that  can  be  used  to value firms 
for sale,  governments  must  simply  release  as much  information 
as  possible  about  these  fums  through  independent  audits.  By 
offering  large  numbers  of  shares  in  these  fms  to  the  public, 
individual  shares  will  be  available  in  small  denominations  that 
can  be  purchased  by  individuals  with  only  small  savings.  The 
auction  of  shares  could  be  modelled  after  the  U.  S.  Treasury 
bill  auction.  That  is,  investors  would  submit  a  tender  in  two 
forms.  With  a competitive  tender,  an  investor  specifies  a price 
and  the  number  of shares  desired.  With  a noncompetitive  tender, 
an  investor  specifies  the  number  of shares  desired  (up  to  some 
maximum  amount  determined  by  the  government)  and  agrees 
to  buy  that  number  of shares  at  the  average  of the  competitive 
bids  that  are  accepted.  (A minimum  payment  is required  when 
tenders  are  submitted.)  The  government  then  accepts  com- 
petitive  bids  up  to a given  fraction  of the  total  shares  and  assigns 
the  remaining  shares  to  the  noncompetitive  bidders. 
Communist  countries  have  had  difficulty  in  pro- 
viding  individual  incentives  because  of  their  in- 
ability  to  commit  to  this  fiscal  consistency.  As 
described  above,  in  centrally  planned  economies, 
prices  are  maintained  through  a  tax-and-transfer 
policy that  subsidizes  some  activities  by taxing  others. 
Under  pressure  to  provide  subsidies,  communist 
governments  were  unable  to commit  to allowing  pro- 
ductive  enterprises  to retain  some  of their  surpluses. 
Litwack  (1989)  describes  how,  in the  Soviet  Union, 
ministries  under  pressure  to  fund  enterprises  run- 
ning  a  deficit  impose  taxes  at  their  discretion  at 
whatever  rates  are  necessary  to  appropriate  the 
surpluses  of  the  remaining  firms.  Firms  then  have 
no  incentive  to  operate  efficiently  and  generate 
surpluses.  On  the  contrary,  discretionary  taxation 
creates  incentives  to  run  a deficit.  Establishment  of 
private  property  rights  requires  a fiscal  system  that 
is operated  without  discretion  and  that  ensures  con- 
sistency  in the  share  of income  appropriated  through 
taxes. 
Countries  desiring  to  make  the  transition  to  a 
market  economy  must  find ways  of committing  their 
governments  to  a  nondiscretionary  fiscal  system. 
More  generally,  they  must  find  ways  of  limiting 
discretionary  government  intervention  in  the 
marketplace.  It  is,  however,  difficult  to  devise  the 
institutional  safeguards  that  provide  for  this  kind  of 
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centive  to  build  the  coalitions  that  keep  them  in 
power  by  assigning  property  rights  and-control  over 
markets  to  groups  that  support  them  politically. 
Communist  countries  represent  an  extreme  of  this 
phenomenon.  No  competition  is allowed  over  owner- 
ship  of  resources.  Conuol  over  resources  is  as- 
signed  to  party  members  in return  for their  support 
of  the  communist  dictatorship. 
There  is a relationship  between  democracy  and  a 
market  economy  in that  each  requires  a resuiction 
of  the  government’s  ability  to  limit  competition. 
Democracy  is  unusual  historically  because  of  the 
difficulty  of devising  ways  to keep  the  coercive  power 
of the  state  from  being  used  to limit  competition  for 
political  power.  The  self-interest  of  individuals  in 
government  works  over  time  to erode  the  safeguards 
placed  on the  ability  of others  to compete  openly  for 
political  power.  Success  in achieving  democracy  and 
a  market  economy  will  depend  on  the  success  of 
formerly  communist  countries  in solving  the  related 
problems  of  how  to  put  into  place  institutional  ar- 
rangements  that  safeguard  free  competition  in  the 
political  arena  and  in  the  economic  marketplace. 
Iv. 
CENTRAL BANKS AND THE 
TRANSITION  TO A MARKET  ECONOMY 
Monetary  Stability 
Countries  desiring  to  establish  relative  prices  that 
measure  the  interaction  between  resource  scarcity 
and  consumer  preferences  need  price  level  stability. 
Determining  equilibrium  relative  prices  is  com- 
plicated  by  a  constantly  changing,  unpredictable 
average  price  level.  Price  stability  requires  an  end 
to rapid  money  creation  which,  in turn,  requires  fiscal 
discipline.  Governments  too  weak  politically  to  levy 
explicit  taxes  resort  to  an  inflation  tax,  which  does 
not  require  legislation.  Eliminating  inflation  therefore 
requires  that  a government  possess  enough  popular 
support  to  enforce  payment  of  taxes. 
Another  difficulty  in  making  the  transition  to 
market  prices  and  price  stability  is the  need  to  end 
price  conuols  and  allow  a one-time  rise  in the  price 
level to eliminate  past,  suppressed  inflation. This  one- 
time  price  rise will cause  a perception  of loss of wealth 
to the  extent  that  persons  were  valuing  their  nominal 
assets  with  a  shadow  price  level  lower  than  the 
equilibrium  price  level.  In  counuies  like  the  Soviet 
Union,  where  the  government  has  always  main- 
tained  that  inflation  is confined  to capitalist  countries, 
it  seems  likely  that  an  open  price  rise  will  be  seen 
by  the  public  as  destructive  of  its  health. 
Eliminating  the  ability  of the  central  bank  to create 
surprise  inflation  is an important  part  of limiting  the 
ability  of  government  to  interfere  arbitrarily  in  the 
economy.  Surprise  inflation  appropriates  part  of the 
value  of existing  money  holdings  and  fixed  income 
securities.  It is inconsistent  with  a fiscal system  pro- 
viding  consistent  rules  to  determine  the  share  of 
private  property  appropriated  for  public  use.  Price 
stability  also  prevents  the  government  from  raising 
revenue  through  the  interaction  of a nonindexed  tax 
code  and  inflation.  In  raising  revenue,  government 
must  respect  the  democratic  safeguards  provided  by 
requiring  that  taxes  be  enacted  through  explicit 
legislation.  Finally,  price  stability  prevents  govern- 
ments  from  creating  a  shadow  fiscal  system  that 
redistributes  income  to  politically  influential  con- 
stituencies  through  the  combination  of inflation  and 
price  controls.  [The  ideas  of  this  paragraph  are 
developed  in  Hetzel  (1990).] 
Market Allocation  of Capital 
In  communist  countries,  banks  are  the  only 
creditors  of enterprises.  In the  transition  to a market 
economy,  banks  will be  r/re arbiters  of which  enter- 
prises  meet  the  market  test  of viability.  Banks  must 
be required  to  make  the  hard  choice  not  to continue 
lending  to  an  insolvent  institution  through  having 
their  own  capital  and  their  own  depositors’  money 
at stake.  Bank failures  must  impose  losses  on holders 
of  bank  liabilities. 
In general,  in a market  economy,  the  government 
must  allow  firms  to  disappear  if  the  marketplace 
determines  they  are  nonviable.  Firm  closings, 
however,  produce  concenuated  pressures  that 
governments  find  hard  to  resist.  Separation  of  the 
central  bank  from  commercial  banks  is necessary  to 
prevent  the  government  from  using  the  central  bank 
to  lend  to  commercial  banks  in  return  for  their 
lending  to  insolvent  but  politically  influential  enter- 
prises.  The  base  money  creation  of the  central  bank 
must  be  resuicted  to  controlling  commercial  bank 
deposit  creation  and  the  price  level,  rather  than  sub- 
sidizing  particular  uses  of credit.  In particular,  either 
the  central  bank  should  not  lend  at  all to  commer- 
cial banks  or,  if it does,  it should  lend  only  for short- 
term  liquidity  needs.  Cutting  commercial  banks  off 
from  central  bank  credit  ensures  that  commercial 
banks  risk  their  own  capital  when  they  lend. 
From  a wider  perspective,  it is essential  that  legal 
arrangements  strike  a  balance  between  requiring 
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incentive  to lend.  An incentive  to lend  rests  on well- 
defined  property  rights  and  on  an  independent 
judiciary  that  adjudicates  disputes  over  property 
rights.  Legal  arrangements  must  include  bank- 
ruptcy  laws  that  allow  borrowers  to  post  collateral 
that  can  be  seized  in  case  of  default  and,  more 
generally,  determine  how  the  assets  of bankrupt  firms 
will  be  distributed  among  creditors.  Private  prop- 
erty  rights  also  require  elimination  of  government 
price  controls.  Banks  cannot  assess  solvency  without 
a price  system  that measures  market-determined  scar- 
city  and  demand.  Price  controls  render  problematic 
bank  decisions  about  solvency.  Nonviable  enterprises 
can  appear  profitable  because  they  obtain  inputs  at 
artifically  low  prices,  while  viable  enterprises  can 
appear  unprofitable  because  they  are  forced  to  sell 
at  artificially  low  prices. 
A  Free  Market in Foreign Exchange 
A  market  economy  requires  a private  market  in 
foreign exchange  with  no capital controls.  Communist 
countries  have  used  their  monopoly  on  trading  in 
foreign  exchange  and  capital  controls  to  enforce  an 
artificially  high  value  for  their  currencies  for  two 
reasons.  First,  as  discussed  above,  these  countries 
subsidize  basic  commodities  and food.  If there  were 
a free  market  in foreign  exchange,  these  items  would 
be  exported.  An  overvalued  exchange  rate  makes 
subsidized  goods  expensive  to foreigners  while  allow- 
ing  the  state  to  sell  them  cheaply  to  domestic 
residents.  Second,  an  overvalued  exchange  rate 
means  that  the  free  market  price  of the  foreign  ex- 
change  turned  over  to  the  government  by  exporters 
exceeds  the  price  that  the  government  charges  im- 
porters.  This  excess  is the  economic  equivalent  of 
an excise  tax  on foreign  exchange  uansactions.  Lie 
a regular  tax,  it can be disuibuted  by the  government. 
For  a weak  government,  it is an easy  tax  to  collect 
and  distribute  to politically  potent  state  enterprises. 
The  price  paid  for an overvalued  exchange  rate  is 
isolation  from  the  world  economy.3  Market  pricing 
and  a market-determined  exchange  rate  would  pro- 
duce  efficient  allocation  of resources  by  encourag- 
ing  a more  open,  export-oriented  economy,  which 
would  bring  the  benefit  of exports  into  line with  their 
domestic  resource  cost.  International  trade  has  pro- 
duced  rising  prosperity  for  countries  integrated  into 
3 Through  Comecon,  communist  countries  entered  into  a large 
number  of barter  arrangements  with  each  other.  These  centrally 
imposed  trades,  however,  do  not  indicate  the  existence  of  an 
open  economy  that  produces  according  to its international  com- 
parative  advantage. 
the  world  economy  through  an efficient  allocation  of 
production  and  through  the  encouragement  to  inno- 
vation  from  worldwide  competition. 
V. 
GERMAN MONETARY UNION 
Governments  desiring  to  establish  a  market 
economy  can  limit  government  intervention  in  the 
economy  by limiting  the  ability  of their  central  banks 
to produce  unpredictable  changes  in the  price  level, 
to  allocate  capital,  and  to  allocate  foreign  exchange. 
The  most  direct  way  to limit  intervention  of the  cen- 
tral  bank  in the  economy  is to  eliminate  the  central 
bank.  Countries  making  the  transition  to  a market 
economy  should  consider  simply  adopting  the  cur- 
rency  of  a large  western  neighbor  with  whom  they 
trade  to  a significant  degree  and  which  possesses  a 
stable  currency.  The  experience  of  East  Germany 
with  monetary  union  is  interesting  because  it  will 
demonsuate  one  practical  way  of limiting  government 
intervention  in the marketplace-elimination  of a cen- 
tral  bank. 
This  proposal  was  made  earlier  by  Milton  Fried- 
man  (1973,  p.  59)  in  the  context  of  LDCs: 
For  most  such  [developingj  countries,  I  believe  the  best 
policy  would  be  to  eschew  the  revenue  from  money  cre- 
ation,  to  unify  its  currency  with  the  currency  of  a  large,. 
relatively  stable  developed  country  with  which  it has  close 
economic  relations,  and  to impose  no barriers  to the  move- 
ment  of  money  or  prices,  wages,  or  interest  rates.  Such  a 
policy  requires  not  having  a  central  bank. 
The  proposal  is also similar in spirit to Wayne  Angers 
(1989)  proposal  that  the  Soviet  Union  adopt  a gold 
standard. 
Monetary  unioneliminates  the  East  German  cen- 
tral  bank.  East  Germany,  like  states  in  the  United 
States,  will have  surrendered  its ability  to run  its own 
monetary  policy.  For  example,  without  a  central 
bank,  Texas  could  not  postpone  the  difficult  ad- 
justments  required  by  the  fall in the  oil price  in’the 
mid-1980s.  First,  because  Texas  cannot  exercise 
discretion  over  its  money  stock,  it had  no  recourse 
to an inflation  tax.  It could  not print  money  to finance 
the  deficit in the  state  budget  caused  by,the  oil-related 
fall  in  revenues. 
Second,  the  state  of Texas  could  not  use  a cen- 
tral  bank  to  keep  alive  thrifts  rendered  insolvent  by 
the  fall in  the  price  of  real  estate.  It  could  not  lend 
to insolvent  thrifts  through  use  of the  money-creating 
powers  of a central  bank.  When  the  price  of oil fell, 
Texas  could  not  keep  its terms  of trade  with  the  rest 
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ing an overvalued  exchange  rate. Texas  had no choice 
but  to  let its price  level  fall to  reflect  a deterioration 
in  its  terms  of  trade.  Also,  no  one  suggested  that 
Texas  impose  capital  controls  to  prevent  capital 
outflows  from  reducing  the  value  of  its  currency. 
German  monetary  union  can  serve  as a model  for 
other  East  European  countries.  A  country  desiring 
to  eliminate  its  central  bank  and  adopt  a deutsche- 
mark  standard  would  first  allow its  currency  to  float 
freely  to  determine  its  equilibrium  value  relative  to 
the  mark.  The  central  bank  would  borrow  marks, 
perhaps  through  the  new  European  Development 
Bank.  On  a preannounced  day,  it  wduld  exchange 
domestic  currency  turned  in  to  banks  for  marks  at 
the  prevailing  free  market  exchange  rate.  It  would 
also exchange  bank  reserves  for marks.  The  central 
bank  would  then  go  out  of  business.  The  country 
would  maintain  no  restrictions  ori  trade  in  foreign 
exchange  and  no  capital  controls.  Henceforth,  the 
marketplace  would  determine  the  quantity  of money 
through  the  balance  of  payments.  If  the  Treasury 
wanted  to  affect  the  domestic  quantity  of money,  it 
would  have to draw on mark  accounts  held with West 
German  banks. 
There  are, of course,  problems  in eliminating  a cen- 
tral bank.  One  problem  is that  if countries  in Eastern 
Europe  establish  a mark  standard,  West  Germany 
receives  the  seigniorage  from  money  creation. 
Overall,  however,  governments  can  determine  the 
net  wealth  transfer  between  Western  and  Eastern 
Europe.  For  example,  partial  forgiveness  of the  debts 
owed  by Eastern  European  countries  could  offset  the 
wealth  transfer  necessary  to finance  their  imports  of 
marks.  The  new  European  Development  Bank  could 
also  finance  the  initial  import  of  marks  through 
interest-free  loans.  Another  problem  is that  countries 
that  suffered  under  Nazi  occupation  may  be  unwill- 
ing to  use  the  mark  as  a currency.  These  countries 
could  adopt  the  dollar  as a currency  ..An  example  is 
Poland,  whose  residents  already  save  partly  through 
dollars  received  from  workers  in the  United  States. 
Conversion  to  a mark  standard  requires  a period 
during  which  countries  stabilize  the foreign  exchange 
value  of their  currency  in  a freely  operated  foreign 
exchange  market.  After  doing  so,  they  may  see  no 
need  then  to  abolish  their  own  currency.  A market 
economy,  however,  isnot  established  by  a one-time 
reform.  It requires  a lasting  commitment  to limiting 
the  role of the  government  in economic  activity.  The 
existence  of  a  central  bank  provides  a  continuing 
incentive  for  politicians  under  pressure  to  confuse 
money  creation  with  wealth  creation.  The  resulting 
inflation  then  leads  to  myriad  interventions  in  the 
economy  in  the  form  of  wage,  price,  interest  rate, 
exchange  market,  and  capital  controls.  Eliminating 
the  central  bank  is one way of committing  to a limited 
role  for  the  state.4 
A  few  years  ago,  this  proposal  would  have  been 
radical.  Today,  it  is  quite  conventional.  It  simply 
telescopes  the  likely  evolution  of monetary  arrange- 
ments  in Eastern  Europe  into  a one-time  reform.  The 
countries  of Eastern  Europe  want  to  integrate  their 
economies  with  the  economies  of western  Europe. 
Western  Europe  is  itself  moving  toward  monetary 
union.  By  adopting  a mark  standard,  the  countries 
of Eastern  Europe  simply  accelerate  the  process  of 
economic  and  monetary  integration  with  Europe. 
They  also  eliminate  the  inflation,  credit  allocation, 
foreign  exchange  controls,  overvalued  exchange  rate, 
and  other  mistaken  policies  that  political  systems 
under  stress  require  of  their  central  banks. 
4 Creation  of a currency  board  would  be  a close  substitute  for 
the  proposal  to  eliminate  the  central  bank.  [See  Hanke  and 
Wakers  (1990).]  With  a currency  board,  base  money  is created 
only  when  someone  turns  in to the  board  a specified  foreign  cur- 
rency,  say,  marks.  Similarly,  base  money  is extinguished  when 
someone  presents  domestic  currency  to  the  board  and  asks  for 
the  foreign  currency.  A currency  board  would  have  the  political 
advantage  that  a domestic  currency  would  circulate,  rather  than 
a foreign  currency.  Also,  the  foreign  currency  held  by the  board 
could  be  kept  in the  government  securities  of the  foreign  coun- 
try,  so  that  the  seigniorage  from  money  creation  would  not  go 
to  the  foreign  country.  The  ,disadvantage  of  a currency  board 
is  that  there is no absolutely  biding  way  to  keep  the  govern- 
ment  from  forcing  it to  devalue  for  domestic  political  reasons. 
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